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Abstract: I derive a model of pro¯t maximization for a print media ¯rm with upfront
advertising pricing. The model is estimated using detailed quarterly data on German
women's magazines observed between I/1994 and IV/2004. Main empirical results are
that (i) cover price increases lead to substantial reductions in advertising revenue, thereby
o®setting possible corresponding gains in magazine sales revenue, (ii) magazines with par-
ticularly large advertising revenues per copy set cover prices well below marginal cost and
(iii) marginal production cost are decreasing in a magazine's own circulation but are un-
a®ected by the own publishers' total printing volume which does not provide evidence for
an e±ciency defense in print media mergers.
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1 Introduction
Print media markets have a property that distinguishes them from other product markets:
a pro¯t{maximizing print media ¯rm must take two types of consumers on board, readers
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Sloth, Minjae Song and Kenneth Wilbur.and advertisers. Advertisers value circulation so that advertising demand and magazine
demand are related | and to the extent that readers (dis{) like advertising, they are
inter{related. Such network externalities have important consequences for print media
pricing since for example an increase in cover prices leads to a decrease in magazine
demand which in turn causes a reduction in advertising revenue.
Other common examples of such \two{sided" markets (Armstrong, forthcoming; Rochet
and Tirole, forthcoming) are classi¯eds, Yellow Pages, matching markets such as employ-
ment websites or dating agencies, other media markets such as newspapers and Internet
Portals as well as trading posts such as auctions, B2B markets, and shopping malls.
Earlier media market studies have acknowledged these demand dependencies,1 but have
neither attempted to estimate their economic importance nor do these studies correspond
well with the speci¯c feature of many media markets that advertising prices (\advertising
rates") are often \upfront prices", e.g. they are published and ¯xed in advance, for
example, in every fall for the entire upcoming year. Such an upfront price disclosure is
present in the German print media industry which is in the focus of the present paper and
in other media markets. Large US media companies such as Viacom/CBS, Disney/ABC,
GE/NBC or Fox for example set advertising rates in spring for advertisements appearing
in fall.2
Recent empirical papers on two{sided markets include Argentesi and Filistrucchi (forth-
coming); Rysman (2004; forthcoming) as well as Kaiser and Wright (2006). Argentesi and
Filistrucchi (forthcoming) study market power in the Italian newspaper industry, Kaiser
and Wright (2006) investigate the price structure in \two{magazine markets" (markets
with just two competing platforms), Rysman (2004) analyzes the utility interdependen-
cies between advertisers and readers of Yellow Pages and Rysman (forthcoming) identi¯es
1Blair and Romano (1993); Bucklin et al. (1989); Chaudhri (1998); Corden (1952{1953); Dertouzos
and Trautman (1990); Dewenter and Kraft (2001); Ferguson (1983); Kaiser and Wright (2006); Merrilees
(1983); Rosse (1967,1970); Thompson (1989).
2See for example Dukes and Gal{Or (2003) who describe such pricing behavior for a Pittburgh NBC
a±liate. There is anecdotal evidence for the Italian newspaper market where price lists are also published
long before the newspapers actually appear.
2positive feedbacks between consumer usage and merchant acceptance for payment cards.
The main contribution of the present paper is that it considers the structure of prices,
e.g. the level of prices on each market side, while the papers by Rysman consider markets
where only one market side is charged. This makes my paper an extension of Kaiser
and Wright (2006) for oligopoly markets. Argentesi and Filistrucchi (forthcoming) do
not discuss subsidization of the advertising market. Other contributions of this paper
are that it (i) provides estimates for scope and scale e®ects in magazine production, (ii)
incorporates upfront pricing as an important feature of many media markets and that
it (iii), like Rysman (2004; forthcoming) but in contrast to Argentesi and Filistrucchi
(forthcoming), allows advertisers to \multi{home", i.e. to advertise in more than one
outlet.
My analysis is based on a theoretical model for media markets with upfront pricing which
is estimated using detailed quarterly data on German women's magazines observed in
the period I/1994 to IV/2004. This data contains information on both magazine reader
characteristics and magazine contents. Estimation of the model allows for insights into
the importance of the market's feedback mechanisms and returns to scale in production.
Attention is restricted to women's magazines since it is the most competitive segment in
the German magazine market.3
Recent industrial policy debates both in Europe (RÄ oller et al. 2000) and in Germany have
dealt with the cost{saving e®ects of mergers. Although neither European nor German
merger legislation explicitly allows for e±ciency defenses, merging ¯rms often claim that
their proposed concentration will lead to cost savings to be passed on to consumers. Such
an argument was for example brought up in a high pro¯le merger case between two German
3In 2004, 49 titles were published, more than twice as many as in the second{densely populated
segment, TV magazines. Market concentration, as measured by the Hirshman{Her¯ndahl index, is much
lower in women's magazines than in any other segment, and this is true both in the magazine demand
and in the advertising demand dimension. Restricting attention to a single subsegment of the magazine
market makes it possible to display and discuss estimation results for individual magazines, an issue that
is especially valuable with respect to the external validation of the estimation results.
3publishers in 2003.4 The German monopoly commission rejected the merging parties' cost
e±ciency arguments. More importantly, the commission also did not explicitly consider
negative feedback e®ects from potential copy price increases to the advertising market.
My paper ¯nds economically signi¯cant feedbacks from advertising to magazine cover
pricing. Magazines substantially subsidize advertising or, to be more precise, advertising
revenue subsidizes circulation costs. The extent of subsidization is the larger the higher
advertising revenue per copy and/or the more elastic advertising rates are with respect to
circulation. Magazines with particularly large negative feedbacks set cover prices markedly
below marginal production cost.
My estimation results provide evidence for substantial returns to scale in production: a
one percent increase in a magazine's own circulation leads to a decrease in marginal cost of
23 percent (standard error seven percent). By contrast, the own publisher's total printing
volume (the total number of pages printed in a given quarter) does not have a signi¯cant
e®ect on marginal cost. This paper provides no evidence that would support an e±ciency
defense in print media merger cases, when such a defense is based on economies of scale
of total publisher circulation.
2 The model
2.1 Model components
My model closely resembles the institutional features of the German magazine market,
and possibly also that of other \upfront" media markets. It is based on several interviews
with industry participants from both markets side, advertisers and publishers.
It consists of three components: (i) an inverse demand for advertising equation, (ii) a
magazine demand equation and (iii) a supply equation. The timing of the model is that
magazines ¯rst set \upfront" advertising rates in period t for period t + 1. Advertising
4The merger case between Georg von Holtzbrinck and Berliner Verlag was eventually blocked
by the German monopoly commission. The commission's report is available on the internet at
http://www.monopolkommission.de/sonder.htm.
4rates depend on expected circulation (which, since I assume static expectations, is in
fact circulation at time t). Magazines thereafter maximize pro¯ts for period t + 1 by
setting cover prices at the end of period t. Their optimal cover price choice depends
upon advertiser's reaction to changes in circulation caused by changes in cover prices
which leads to a pricing equation that depends on this demand dependency. Magazine's
strategic variables are advertising rates and cover prices. Marginal cost are backed out
from the supply equation.
2.2 Institutional framework
German print media determine and publish advertising rates in November each year.5
These rates are valid for the entire upcoming year. None of the magazines in my data
changed advertising rates within a year. Advertiser willingness to pay for advertising space
depends on, according to advertisers and advertising booking agencies I have spoken to, (i)
the extent to which a magazine reaches the advertiser's target audience and (ii) circulation.
This is consistent with earlier empirical work on print media markets work by Thompson
(1989). Advertising rates are set, as one industry source put it, \in consultation" with
major advertisers, most importantly advertising booking agencies.
The composition of a magazine's readership varies little over time, which could be a
consequence of little \within" variation in magazine content.6 If publishers identify a new
reader group that may attract advertisers, they would rather launch a new magazine than
change the content of existing magazines. This implies that magazine content, and thus
readership composition, is not a magazine's choice variable (given magazine launch).
A large fraction, up to 80 percent, of advertising pages is booked one year in advance.7
5A typical example for a advertising price list, a brochure that contains ad-
vertising rates and readership composition information, is downloadable at URL
http://www.media.brigitte.de/de/brigitte/pdf/brigitte preisliste2006.pdf.
6Dewenter and Kaiser (2006) discuss readership and content composition of German magazine market
in detail.
7Personal communication with Armin Rott (Hamburg Media School) who also assessed that upfront
booking has been declining in the past few years and that upfront booking various substantially across
5Magazines tend to set cover prices following the publication of the advertising rates at
the end of period t having in mind the consequences of their price setting for both sides
of the market.
A ¯nal issue worth mentioning in an institutional context is that the ratio of advertising
pages to content pages is fairly constant across time for each magazine; there is little
\within" variation. Even though my industry sources did not explicitly subscribe to my
interpretation, it seems that magazines take as many advertisements as possible and add
content pages until the long{run ratio of advertisements to content is reached. This leads
to a high correlation between advertising pages and content pages. The coe±cient of
correlation in my data is 0.75.
2.3 Magazine grouping
Magazine demand is modelled in a \nested logit" framework as described in Subsection
4. It requires to partition the women's magazine market into subsegments. My group-
ing of women's magazines follows industry convention, for example Jahreszeitenverlag
(1994{2004), so that I am inclined to believe that it is appropriate. The publishing indus-
try distinguishes the following market segments: fashion magazines, lifestyle magazines,
classical magazines, counselling magazines, \yellow" women's magazines and \girls" mag-
azines.
Table 1 displays some summary statistics for the six market segments. It shows that
there are very distinct di®erences between groups (but a lot of similarities within groups,
not shown in the table) regarding circulation, circulation revenue (circulation times copy
price), advertising and advertising revenue (advertising pages times advertising rates).
Magazine groups that have a large market share in circulation, for example \counselling
magazines", do not necessarily possess large market shares on the advertising side. This
emphasizes the importance of targeting \valuable" (to the advertisers) audiences.
Insert Table 1 about here!
magazines.
62.4 Inverse demand for advertising
To model inverse demand for advertising I borrow the constant elasticity framework used
by Berry and Waldfogel (1999), who model the demand for advertising time in radio
broadcasting, since it combines the two most important ingredients of advertising rate
determination | audience targeting and circulation | with the upfront pricing mecha-
nism in a simple way. Such a framework is also chosen by Rysman (2004) to model inverse
demand for advertising space in Yellow Pages.








where the term ¸jt+1 is a scalar that relates observed and unobserved features of magazine
j and its readership characteristics (target audience characteristics) to advertising price
at time t + 1 and E[:] is the usual expectations operator. The term q denotes magazine
circulation and ADP denotes the number of advertising pages.
The term ¸ is assumed to depend upon variables that in°uence advertising prices, sum-
marized by row vector w, and an unobserved (to me) component that is denoted by
Ã:
¸jt+1 = exp(wjt+1· + Ãjt+1): (2)
The error term Ã is decomposed into a time{invariant component that may be correlated
with w (\¯xed e®ect") and an idiosyncratic component: Ãjt+1 = !j + $jt+1.
Taking logarithms and under the assumption of static expectations, my speci¯cation of
the inverse demand for advertising is:
ln(p
a
jt+1) = ´ln(qjt) + ±ln(ADPjt) + wjt· + !j + $jt: (3)
An alternative representation of the advertising equation is a logit{type demand function
where advertisers choose between placing advertisement in di®erentiated outlets. Such a
speci¯cation is chosen by Argentesi and Filistrucchi (forthcoming) to model advertising
demand for four national Italian newspapers. It is, however, not consistent with upfront
7pricing and is also problematic with respect to potential multi{homing by advertisers.
While multi{homing is not an issue for the market considered by Argentesi and Filistrucchi
(forthcoming), it is of considerable importance for German women's magazines. Kaiser
and Wright (2006) calculate that 10.6 percent of the advertisers in \Women's fashion"
magazines and 37.2 percent of the advertisers in \Women's counselling" magazines multi{
home. Both magazine segments are part of my data.
2.5 Magazine demand
Nested logit demand
Magazine demand is speci¯ed by a \nested logit" functional form (Anderson et al. 1992),
a standard model in empirical industrial organization. This model is very well described
in the literature so that I omit a detailed description here.
The nested logit demand model places products into di®erent groups so that products
within a group are similar to one another and products of di®erent groups are dissimilar.
The correlation between magazines within the same group is represented by parameter ¾,
a parameter that is to be estimated.
Relative demand for magazine j at time t is given by:
ln(sjt) ¡ ln(s0t) = xjt¯ + ®jtp
c
jt + ¾ln(¹ sjtjg) + ¿t + ¹j + »jt; (4)
where sjt denotes the market share of magazine j at time t (relative to market size M)
and s0t denotes the market share of the \outside good" which is needed to identify the
model. It is de¯ned as s0t = (Mt ¡
PN
j=1 Mtsjt)=Mt, where M is total market size. M is
de¯ned as total German female population aged 14 years or older, and the summation is
over all women's magazines in the data. Magazine j's relative market share depends on
its cover price, pc, observed magazine quality characteristics, x, and unobserved (to me)
time{invariant quality characteristics (\¯xed e®ects"), ¹j, the market share of magazine
j at time t in magazine group g, ¹ sjtjg, and demand shocks that are the same for all
magazines, ¿t. The term » denotes unobserved time{variant magazine{speci¯c quality
components. Note that the ¯xed e®ects capture for example magazine periodicity and
8publisher identity since both variables do not vary over time.
Magazine periodicity
Magazines appear in di®erent frequencies (weekly, biweekly and monthly). Much like Nevo
(2001), who converts pounds of cereal into daily servings in his study of the US ready{to{
eat cereal industry, I convert magazine circulation (and also the number of content pages)
into weekly units. For example, if a magazine appears once a month, the corresponding
circulation is divided by 4, if it appears biweekly it is divided by 2 and if it appears once
a week, circulation and the number of content pages is left unchanged. My estimation
results di®er neither qualitatively nor quantitatively much if magazine circulation and the
number of content pages is converted into monthly units instead.
Reader multi{homing
Multi{homing by magazine readers is a potential problem in logit{type models of demand.
These models assume that the consumer and product{speci¯c utility component is i.i.d.
extreme value distributed which leads to the logit demand function. The i.i.d. assumption
is problematic if readers multi{home unless consumer preferences for magazine A are
uncorrelated with preferences for magazine B.
I use data from a consumer survey that asked readers what magazines, apart from maga-
zine A, they read to assess how important multi{homing is in my data. The word \read"
is emphasized here since the questionnaire does not ask consumers for actual purchase
decisions. This distinction is particularly important for women's magazines that seem to
belong to the standard equipment of hairdressers and the practices of medical doctors.
The consumer survey data is therefore very likely to substantially overstate actual multi{
buying. The average fraction of readers of a particular magazine that multi{read is 5.8
percent in my data.
Kaiser and Wright (2006) use the same consumer survey data and ¯nd that 6 percent
of the \Fashion" magazine readers and that 10.7 percent of the \Women's counselling"
magazine readers multi{read. They follow a suggestion by Doganoglu and Wright (2006)
and calculate adjustment factors for their Hotelling{type demand model which are based
9on those multi{reader fractions. Application of those adjustment factors does not quali-
tatively change their results.
Since the degree to which consumers multi{read is relatively low and since the extent of
actual multi{homing is even lower, I proceed with the nested logit model as formulated
in Equation (4).
An alternative setup of my nested logit model is a model where consumers ¯rst choose
content and then the periodicity of magazines. Such a model collapses into the nesting
structure of Equation (4) since, with one exception, magazines in each group have the
same periodicity (see Table 1). A reverse nesting structure is also problematic since the
\Classical" magazines are the only ones with biweekly appearance.
2.6 Pro¯t maximization
When magazines determine cover prices shortly after they publish advertising rates, they
maximize their expected pro¯ts for the upcoming year and take the feedback e®ects of










where C(:) denotes the cost of producing magazines. These cost depend upon circulation,
q = Ms, as well as upon observed and unobserved cost components, z and º respectively.
There are two things noteworthy about Equation (5). First, cover prices set in period t+1
determine circulation in period t+1 and thereby advertising rates in period t+2. There
hence is no contemporaneous link between advertising rates and cover prices which is
consistent with the institutional settings. A contemporaneous link is established, however,
through my assumption of static expectations. Second, optimal cover prices depend not
only on revenues from copy sales, but also on revenues from advertising sales, which
depends on the number of copies sold.
After substituting the inverse demand equation for advertising rates, Equation (1), into




































\usual markup" \markup deterioration"
(7)
where the markup deterioration | the network externality | is the change in advertising
revenue that is caused by a cover price change.
Cover prices hence deviate from the usual \price{equals{marginal{cost{plus{a{markup"
formula of standard oligopoly models by a markup deterioration that depends upon
the circulation elasticity of advertising demand, ´, and advertising revenue per copy,
paADP=q: the less circulation{elastic advertising demand (given advertising revenue per
copy) and the higher advertising revenue per copy, the larger the markup deterioration.
Magazines hence \cannibalize" cover prices in order to increase advertising sales, unless
´ = 0 (advertisers do not care about circulation) and/or they do not sell advertising space.
Marginal cost might even exceed cover prices if advertising demand is very circulation
elastic and/or if magazines make large revenues from advertising sales. Below marginal
cost pricing is a well documented phenomenon in the newspaper industry (Ludwig 2003;
Wagner 1981).
3 Data
My data set consists of information on all 49 German women's magazines that existed be-
tween the ¯rst quarter of 1994 and the fourth quarter of 2004. A total of 1,673 observations
is used in the (quarterly) estimations. Data on circulation, cover prices, editorial pages
and advertising pages were downloaded from the internet at http://medialine.focus.de.
8Note that the term M, total market size, cancels out from Equation (6).
11This data has been updated quarterly since 1972 and is continuously recorded.9 It is
complemented by annual information on magazine contents that I received from the
publishing house \Jahreszeitenverlag" (Jahreszeitenverlag 1994{2004). Jahreszeitenver-
lag distinguishes between 22 di®erent content categories. These are: fashion for purchase,
self{crafted fashion, cosmetics, cooking, interior design, handicraft, children, health, part-
nership, vacation, counselling, hobby, cars, politics, science, the arts, sensational journal-
ism, VIPs, ¯ction, sex as entertainment, TV program, and service pages of the editors
(Table of Contents etc.). The content shares are, for example, measured as the ratio of
cosmetics pages to the total number of content pages.
Data on magazine reader characteristics was provided by \Arbeitsgemeinschaft Media{
Analyse" (AG.MA), an association of the German advertising industry for the research
of mass communication.
Advertising rates and cover prices are measured in Euro and are de°ated by the quarterly
German consumer price index. My magazine data contains price and quantity information
on three types of advertisements: black and white advertisements, two{color advertise-
ments and four color advertisements. I use this information to de¯ne advertising rates as
the weighted average of these three types of advertisements. Estimation results remain
una®ected when I use the price for a four color advertisement instead. This is unsurprising
since the coe±cient of correlation between the two advertising rate measures is 0.92.
Descriptive statistics of the variables involved in the estimations are presented in Appendix
A.
4 Empirical speci¯cation
Inverse demand for advertising
9The original data source is \Information Association for the Determination of the Spread of Advertis-
ing Media" (\Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von WerbetrÄ agern e.V.", IVW).
IVW ascertains, monitors and publishes circulation and magazine dissemination information. It is the
German equivalent to the US Bureau of Circulation.
12Elements of the vector of magazine and consumer characteristics, w, that a®ect adver-
tising rates are (i) the shares of readers in age groups 14{19, 20{29, 30{39, 40{49 and
50{59 years (base age group: more than 59 years of age) to take into account advertisers'
preferences with regard to the age distribution of readers, (ii) the content share variables
and (iii) the set of year dummy variables that represent shocks common to all magazines,
for example business cycle e®ects.
The other components of inverse demand for advertising, circulation, q, and the number
of advertising pages, ADP, are endogenous variables. Identi¯cation issues related to all
three equations to be estimated are discussed in Section 5.
Magazine demand
Elements of the vector of magazine and consumer characteristics, x, that a®ect magazine
demand are (i) the natural logarithm of the number of content pages to capture consumer
utility received from content pages, (ii) the share of advertising pages in the total number
of pages to account for consumer preferences regarding advertising intensity, (iii) the set of
content share variables, (iv) content share concentration (measured as the sum of squared
content shares), (v) year dummy variables and (vi) quarter dummy variables. I use the
share of advertising pages in the total number pages instead of the level of advertising
pages because of the high correlation between advertising pages and content pages.
Other components of magazine demand are cover prices, pc, and within group market
shares, ¹ s. Both variables are endogenous since both consumers and producers know the
unobserved magazine quality component ». The ratio of advertising pages to the total
number of pages is endogenous since advertising demand depends on magazine demand.
As discussed in Section 2.2, it appears as if there is a ¯xed ratio of advertising pages to
content pages, so the number of content pages is an endogenous variable as well.
Cost components




so that estimating an equation for marginal cost is not needed to identify the model.
Regressing marginal cost on factors that are likely to a®ect them is, however, instructive
13with respect to cost savings due to returns to scale and scope in production.
To derive an estimable supply equation I need a functional form assumption for marginal
cost. To guarantee that marginal cost are positive, I de¯ne @Cjt(:)=@qjt = exp(aqjt +
zjt° + ºjt). This, in combination with my assumption of static expectations, yields the

















I decompose the error term ºjt into a \¯xed e®ect" and an idiosyncratic component. The
¯xed e®ects capture for example paper quality (e.g. glossy paper) or publisher{speci¯c
factors.
Variables in z are (i) scale variables, (ii) scope variables, and (iii) shocks common to all
magazines.
(i) Scale variables are (a) the natural logarithm of a magazine's circulation | it is well
known that newspaper production cost decrease substantially in circulation (Dertouzos
and Thorpe 1982; Dertouzos and Trautman 1990; Genesove 2003; Ludwig 2003; Rosse
1967, 1970; Wagner 1981) | and (b) the natural logarithm of own publisher's \printing
volume". Printing volume of magazine A is de¯ned as the total number of pages produced
by the own publisher in a given quarter. I exclude the total number of pages produced for
magazine A from the calculation to obtain a direct measure of the e®ects of a concentration
on marginal cost.
Printing volume e®ects on marginal cost, if they exist, may be due to discounts in paper
purchasing. Paper cost make, according to industry professionals, around 30 per cent of
all variable printing cost. Discounts on paper purchase are common practice and a larger
printing volume increases buyer power.10 Both scale variables need to be instrumented
since they are functions of unobserved marginal cost º as it is discussed in detail in Section
5 below.
(ii) Scope variables are (a) the total number of magazines published by the own publishing
house and (b) the total number of market segments (including segments outside the
10Personal correspondence with JÄ org HÄ uner, Prinect Systemhaus Heidelberg.
14women's magazine market) the own publisher is active in. The e®ects of these variables
is unclear a priori. Multi magazine/multi group publishers might have more °exible
production technologies at their disposal so that they can quickly adjust printing machines
to their current needs. Compared to more specialized publishers they might, however, be
less able to exploit cost digressions in production since less specialized publishers might
use more specialized printing equipment.
I also include the NBSK Pulp Benchmark Index, a price index for pulp and paper prices,
as a common cost shock.
5 Identi¯cation
The endogenous variables of my model are: cover price, within group market share,
the natural logarithm of content pages and the ratio of advertising pages to the total
number of pages in the magazine demand equation; the number of advertising pages and
circulation in the inverse demand for advertising equation as well as the natural logarithm
of a magazine's total circulation and the natural logarithm of the printing volume of the
own publisher in the marginal cost equation.
Table 2 provides an overview of the endogenous variables and their instruments.
5.1 Identi¯cation of the coe±cients in the demand equations
My main assumption regarding the identi¯cation of the two demand equations is, like in
Kaiser and Wright (2006), that (unobserved) cost factors are common across magazines
published by a magazine's own publisher and that other (demand{side) shocks are not
correlated with these factors, an approach used by Hausman (1997). This for example
implies that cover prices of a publisher's magazines in other segments of the magazine
market are assumed to be driven by common underlying costs associated with a publisher's
production, distribution and marketing of its magazines to readers. These costs also
determine the cover price of a particular magazine, but are assumed to be uncorrelated
with the error terms in the product demand equations which is why the average cover
15price of a publisher's other magazines can for example be used as an instrument for cover
prices.11
I follow the same identi¯cation strategy for the number of advertising pages, the num-
ber of content pages and the share of advertising pages: common (unobserved) demand
factors a®ect publishers, and these factors are uncorrelated with the magazine's marginal
cost shocks. Due to for example better management, some publishers at certain times
may be better than others at attracting successful editors, across their whole range of
magazines. Successful editors produce popular content that attracts a larger number of
readers. Alternatively, a particular publisher may have access to a wider distribution
channel than other publishers, resulting in higher demand for all magazines. By the same
token, a particular publisher may form an ongoing relationship with a large advertising
client through one of its magazines, but this will tend to raise demand for advertising in
the publisher's other magazines, given some large advertisers may place advertisements
across di®erent magazine markets (\cross{selling" as it is termed in the media industry).
This suggests that reasonable instruments for my three other endogenous variables in
the magazine demand equation are the average number of advertising pages, the average
number of content pages and the average share of advertising pages of the publisher's
other magazines.
A number of additional instruments is used. To instrument cover prices I also use the pulp
and paper price index as a cost{side variable that should be unrelated to the unobserved
magazine{speci¯c quality component ». I also use a dummy variable that is coded one if a
magazine of the own publisher contained a supplement in a given quarter as an instrument
for the number of advertising pages in the inverse demand for advertising equation and
as an instrument for advertising share in the magazine demand equation. Supplements
11If the magazine demand equation was not estimated by ¯xed e®ects, other magazines' prices could
not be used as an instrument if, for example, a publisher's strategy is to cluster publications among high
quality content or to use glossy (and therefore costly) paper since other magazines' cover prices then
re°ect unobserved publisher quality. The ¯xed e®ects proxy, however, publisher strategy directly (at
least to the extent it is time{invariant).
16expand advertising space while advertising rates for the core magazine cannot react in
the short{run. Supplements by magazines from the same publisher hence induce compe-
tition for advertisers but are unlikely to a®ect unobserved quality of a magazine from an
advertiser's perspective, $.
Within group market share is instrumented by the ratio of the number of market segments
the own publisher is active in to the number of market segments competing publishers
are active in. It measures how diversi¯ed the own publisher is relative to competing
publishers. A highly diversi¯ed publisher will not be in a competitively strong position in
any one market segment and hence will possess relatively low within group market shares.
At the same time, diversi¯cation is unlikely to a®ect unobserved magazine quality ».
I instrument magazine circulation in the inverse demand for advertising equation by my
cover price instruments, average cover prices of other magazines by the own publisher,
and the paper and pulp price index since magazine circulation is a function of cover
prices. The pulp and paper index is interacted with publisher{speci¯c dummy variables
to introduce additional variation to the index.12
Some elements of the vector of cost{components, z, described in Section 4, are candidates
as instruments for cover prices. I experimented with the inclusion of these variables but
tests for orthogonality rejected their validity.
5.2 Identi¯cation of the parameters in the supply equation
While it is fairly straightforward to ¯nd instruments for the endogenous variables in the
magazine demand and the advertising demand equations through variables that are likely
to a®ect production cost but not demand, it is much harder to ¯nd instruments for the
endogenous variables in the marginal cost equation. To identify the related parameters
in the marginal cost equation, one would need to ¯nd variables that a®ect for example
demand but not unobserved marginal cost º. In that vein, a candidate instrument for
12Tests for orthogonality reject the interactions in the magazine demand equation which is why cover
prices are only instrumented with the pulp and paper index and not also with the interactions in that
equation.
17circulation is total circulation by other publishers since demand shocks hitting competing
publishers are unlikely to be related to unobserved marginal cost but have an e®ect on
magazine circulation. This variable varies, however, only across publishers and not across
magazines. Another candidate instruments for circulation is the composition of disposable
income of magazine readers which I do not observe.
My approach to identify the parameters of the marginal cost equation therefore is to use
the four period lags (one year lags) of the two endogenous variables and the four period
lag of the cover price instrument as instruments. The identifying assumption here is that
marginal cost shocks are not correlated between period t and period t ¡ 4.
5.3 Instrument validity
For an instrument to be valid it needs to have two properties: (i) correlation with the en-
dogenous variable and (ii) uncorrelatedness with the error term of the equation of interest.
The ¯rst property is tested by estimating \¯rst stage" regressions of the endogenous vari-
ables on the instruments and the exogenous variables. Corresponding estimation results
are shown in Appendix B. The appendix indeed shows a high correlation between the
instruments and the endogenous variables in all three equations. The instruments are at
least jointly highly signi¯cant, and all equations include various instruments that are also
separately highly signi¯cant. The second property is checked by tests for overidentifying
restrictions. The results tables, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5, show the corresponding test
statistics. These tests cannot reject that my instruments are orthogonal to the residual
of the equation of interest.
Insert Table 2 about here!
5.4 Estimation technique
I estimate the inverse demand for advertising equation, the magazine demand equation
and the marginal cost equation separately one after the other. The reason for doing
the less e±cient equation{by{equation estimation rather than joint estimation is that a
18mis{speci¯cation of any of the three equations contaminates the estimates of the other
equations. Another reason is the di®erence in the periodicity of the data. Advertising
rates are set annually so that I annualize the originally quarterly data. My magazine
demand equation is based on quarterly data and so is the marginal cost equation.
All equations are estimated by instrumental{variables methods (Two Stages Least Squares)
using the instruments listed in Table 2. All variance covariance matrices are robust to
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
6 Results
6.1 Advertising rate equation
Estimation results for the advertising rate equation are shown in Table 3. The coe±cient
on circulation in the inverse demand for advertising equation is 0.36 (standard error
0.16), implying positive feedback e®ects from magazine demand to advertising demand.
Advertisers in German women's magazines hence have a substantially smaller willingness
to pay for circulation than advertisers in US Yellow Pages have for usage. Rysman's
(2004) estimate for the latter is 0.56 (standard error 0.13). This di®erence in usage e®ects
could re°ect the higher ability of women's magazines to focus target audiences compared
to Yellow Pages.
The point estimate for the e®ect of advertising pages on advertising rates is -0.17 (standard
error 0.08) which compares to Rysman's corresponding estimate of -0.73 (standard error
0.19).
Table 3 underscores the importance of instrumenting the number of advertising pages and
circulation. If the latter is not instrumented, a positive and highly signi¯cant e®ect of
advertising pages on advertising rates is estimated. This is an economically implausible
result since it indicates upward sloping demand for advertising. A comparison of the
IV and OLS results also shows that the coe±cient on circulation substantially increases
which is consistent with a positive correlation between circulation and the unobserved
19inverse demand for advertising component, $: a shock in unobserved advertising e±ciency
is positively correlated with circulation, possibly since it is positively correlated with
unobserved magazine quality ».
The estimation results also indicate that advertisers particularly appreciate consumers
aged 50 to 59 years, young consumers between 14 and 19 years of age and consumers
between 30 and 39 years. The remaining age groups are less popular with the di®erences
between them being insigni¯cant.
The set of content shares plays a statistically signi¯cant role in the determination of
advertising rates. It is jointly signi¯cant at the ¯ve percent marginal signi¯cance level.
Insert Table 3 about here!
6.2 Magazine demand equation
Estimation results for the magazine demand equation are shown in Table 4.13 The coe±-
cient on price, ®, is -0.25 (standard error 0.09) which means that a one unit (i.e. one Euro)
change in (de°ated) cover prices leads to a percentage decrease in relative market shares
(relative to the outside good) of the same magnitude. The point estimate of the within{
group correlation coe±cient, ¾, is 0.86 (standard error 0.09), suggesting that a magazine
in one segment is a poor substitute to a magazine in another segment. A comparison of
IV and OLS estimates shows that both coe±cients are substantially larger once they are
instrumented, indicating a positive correlation between unobserved magazine quality and
prices as well as within group market shares.
Consumers like magazines that come with many content pages and are advertising{
neutral. The latter ¯nding di®ers from Kaiser and Wright (2006), who estimate posi-
tive e®ects of advertising on magazine market shares. Their data do, however, contain
13Note that the number of magazines di®ers between the magazine demand estimation and the inverse
demand for advertising equation. This is so since the age variables are missing for eight magazines.
Leaving the age variables out leads to a point estimate for ´ of 0.48 in the inverse demand for advertising
equation which includes, given a standard error of 0.15, the point estimate of the speci¯cation that does
include the age variables.
20very di®erent magazine segments like Do{it{yourself or Photography magazines where
advertising may be more informative than for women's magazines.
Content shares are jointly highly signi¯cant determinants of magazine demand.
Insert Table 4 about here!
6.3 Marginal cost equation
Estimation results for the marginal cost equation are displayed in Table 5. It shows
that there are economically sizeable and statistically highly signi¯cant returns to scale in
magazine production: own circulation has a highly signi¯cant and economically sizeable
negative e®ect on marginal cost. Such a ¯nding of signi¯cant and economically sizeable
returns to scale is a main explanation for the existence of \few (and fewer and fewer)
two{newspaper towns" (Genesove 2003).
Table 5 also shows, however, that printing volume does not have a statistically signi¯cant
impact on marginal cost. This implies that my results do not support an e±ciency defence
in print media mergers.
One of my measures for returns to scope in production, the total number of titles produced
by the own publisher is statistically signi¯cant from zero and positive which implies that
product diversi¯cation increases production cost. This is clearly not an argument in favor
of cost e±ciency gains due to mergers either.
The other proxy variable for returns to scope, the number of magazine groups a magazine
is active in, is insigni¯cant at any conventional signi¯cance level.
Insert Table 6 about here!
6.4 Implied pricing structure
Table 6 displays the main results that I back out of my model: marginal cost, the absolute
di®erence of cover prices and marginal cost, the \usual" markup, the \markup deteriora-
tion" and advertising revenue per copy. The ¯gures are averages for 2004 or for the last
available year for those magazines that exited the market prior to 2004.
21The most important result of Table 6 is that a substantial fraction of magazines, one
quarter, indeed sets cover prices below marginal cost, thereby subsidizing the advertising
side of the magazine market.
All \fashion" magazines, all \classical" magazines as well as more than half of the \lifestyle"
magazines and \classical" magazines show such pricing behavior. These are the magazine
groups where advertising revenue per copy is particularly large.
By contrast, the less advertising intensive segments \counselling" and \yellows" price
above marginal cost.
In Appendix C I conduct an external validation of my marginal cost estimates based
on information I gathered from industry sources and compare them with my estimated
marginal cost. I ¯nd that they generally compare quite well, thereby providing indication
for model validity. My cost estimates for the fashion magazines appear, however, to be
too high.
7 Conclusions
This paper derives and estimates a model for media markets where advertising rates are
set \upfront", e.g. long before advertisements are actually published. It is estimated on
data for German women's magazines where such pricing behavior is present. The model
underlines the importance of taking the two{sidedness of magazine markets into account.
It consists of three equations, an inverse demand for advertising equation, an equation
for magazine demand and a supply equation from which I obtain estimates for marginal
production cost.
A main estimation result is that below{marginal{cost{pricing is predominant for maga-
zines whose advertising rates depend, through the circulation feedback, strongly on cover
prices. Those magazines substantially subsidize their advertising revenue stream by set-
ting low cover prices that may even lead to negative magazine sales revenue. This suggests
that any increase in cover prices has to be weighed against (over{) compensating losses
in advertising revenue.
22My estimation results also indicate statistically signi¯cant and economically substantial
returns to scale in production, as measured by a magazine's own circulation. The own
publishers total printing volume, a variable that is directly a®ected by a media merger,
does not have a statistically signi¯cant e®ect on marginal cost. This paper hence does not
provide evidence in favor of an e±ciency defense in print media mergers if total printing
volume is used as a measure of economies of scale.
23Table 1: Summary statistics
Fashion Lifestyle Classical Counselling \Girls" \Yellow"
magazines magazines magazines magazines magazines magazines
Periodicity Monthly Monthly Biweekly Weekly Weekly Weekly, biweekly,
monthly
Market shares across magazine groups
Circulation share 3.1 11.6 14.2 25.4 8.1 38
Advertising share 14.7 15.2 40.1 16.9 4.2 9.3
Circulation revenue share 9 17.5 19 14.8 9.1 31.3
Advertising revenue share 15.3 16.7 24.5 13.9 5.9 24.4
Averages within magazine groups
Circulation per quarter 131,073 353,360 733,321 1,041,662 333,420 611,743
# of advertising pages per quarter 365 187 492 239 113 181
Cover price 4.49 1.85 1.62 0.84 1.55 1.01
Advertising rate 13,875 11,238 22,896 20,051 11,386 8,857
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the six magazine groups. The market shares are in percent of the total women's
magazine market. Cover prices and advertising rates are measured in Euros.
Table 2: List of endogenous variables and their instruments
Endogenous variables Instruments
Inverse demand for advertising equation
# advertising pages # adpages in other magazines by own publisher;
Dummy for other magazines by same publisher with supplements;
Circulation Average cover price of other magazines by own publisher;
Pulp and paper price index interacted with
publisher dummies
Magazine demand equation
Cover price Main cover price instrument at t and t ¡ 1;
Pulp and paper price index;
Within group market share # of segments own publisher is active in/# of segments relative to
competing publishers are active in at t and t ¡ 1;
# content pages # of content pages of other magazines by own publisher at t and t ¡ 1;
Share advertising Dummy for other magazines by same publisher with supplements;
pages Share of advertising pages of other by own publisher at t and t ¡ 1
Marginal cost equation
Circulation Circulation lagged by one year;
Printing volume Total # of pages of publisher's other magazines lagged by one year
Table 2 summarizes instrument choice. The subscript t ¡ 1 corresponds to the previous quarter in the magazine demand
and marginal cost equation. It corresponds to the previous year in the inverse demand for advertising equation.
24Table 3: Fixed e®ects estimation results for inverse advertising demand, Equation (3)
IV OLS
Coe®. Std. Err. Coe®. Std. Err.
Parameters of main interest
ln(APD) (±) -0.17** 0.08 0.04* 0.03
ln(q) (´) 0.36** 0.16 0.22*** 0.04
Consumer age shares
Share consumers 14{19 years 0.79** 0.40 0.25 0.26
Share consumers 20{29 years -0.36 0.31 -0.18 0.25
Share consumers 30{39 years 0.54* 0.33 0.29 0.22
Share consumers 40{49 years 0.14 0.38 -0.06 0.27
Share consumers 50{59 years 1.08*** 0.31 0.74*** 0.24
Test of overidentifying restrictions
Test p{val.
20.94 0.18
Within R2, # of obs. and # of magazines
Test p{val. Test p{val.
Speci¯cation 92.95 0.00 3.67 0.00
Content shares 36.80 0.02 1.95 0.01
Consumer age shares 18.87 0.00 3.21 0.01
Year dummies 11.62 0.31 3.53 0.00
Fixed e®ects 21.53 0.00 36.99 0.00
\Within" R2, # of observations and # of magazines
Within R2 0.14 0.30
# obs. 367 397
# magazines 41 43
Table 3 displays ¯xed e®ects regression results of Equation (3). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the
advertising rate in period t+1. Explanatory variables are measured at t. The left panel of the table (\IV") shows IV ¯xed
e®ects estimation results, the right panel (\OLS") shows ¯xed e®ects estimation results without instrumentation. Table
2 provides a list of instruments used in the IV estimation. Both speci¯cations contain year dummies and 21 shares of
magazine content as listed in Section 3. The asteriks' \***", \**" and \*" indicate statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve
and ten percent marginal signi¯cance level.
25Table 4: Fixed e®ects estimation results for magazine demand, Equation (4)
IV OLS
Coe®. Std. Err. Coe®. Std. Err.
Cover price (®) -0.25*** 0.09 -0.10*** 0.01
ln(sjjg) (¾) 0.86*** 0.09 0.71*** 0.01
Advertising share -0.21 0.49 0.18*** 0.05
ln(# content pages) 0.34** 0.15 0.11*** 0.02
Content conc. -0.09 0.31 0.25 0.17
Test of overidentifying restrictions
Stat. p{val.
6.59 0.36
Tests of joined signi¯cance
Wald p{val. F p{val.
Content shares 111.47 0.00 10.91 0.00
Year dummies 799.89 0.00 277.49 0.00
Quarter dummies 29.40 0.00 137.50 0.00
Fixed e®ects 451.50 0.00 680.63 0.00
Speci¯cation 10072.19 0.00 449.25 0.00
\Within" R2, # of observations and # of magazines
Within R2 0.88 0.92
# obs. 1,673 1,681
# magazines 49 49
Table 4 displays ¯xed e®ects regression results of Equation (4). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of relative
market share of magazine j at time t, ln(sjt=s0t). The left panel of the table (\IV") shows IV ¯xed e®ects estimation
results, the right panel (\OLS") shows ¯xed e®ects estimation results without instrumentation. Table 2 provides a list of
instruments used in the IV estimation. Both speci¯cations contain quarter dummies, year dummies, 21 shares of magazine
content as listed in Section 3 and a content concentration index. The asteriks' \***" and \**" indicate statistical signi¯cance
at the one and ¯ve percent marginal signi¯cance level.
26Table 5: Fixed e®ects estimation results for marginal cost
IV OLS
Coe®. Std. Err. Coe®. Std. Err.
Endogenous variables
ln(circulation) -0.23*** 0.07 -0.45*** 0.05
ln(printing volume by own publisher) -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Scope variables
# of titles by own publisher 0.04*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.00
# groups own publisher is active in -0.02 0.02 -0.018 0.01
Pulp and paper index
Pulp & paper index 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.06
Test of overidentifying restrictions
Stat. p{val.
1.45 0.69
Tests of joined signi¯cance
F p{val. F p{val.
Fixed e®ects 262.41 0.00 304.10 0.00
Wald p{val. F p{val.
Scope e®ects 50.75 0.00 25.38 0.00
Scale e®ects 16.00 0.00 48.13 0.00
Year dummies 37.1 0.00 3.29 0.01
Quarter dummies 35.98 0.00 11.29 0.00
Speci¯cation 1458.13 0.00 26.16 0.00
\Within" R2, # of obs., # of magazines, test for overid. Restr.
Within R2 0.21 0.23
# obs. 1,469 1,615
# magazines 48 48
Table 5 displays ¯xed e®ects regression results of Equation (8). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of marginal
production cost. The left panel of the table (\IV") shows IV ¯xed e®ects estimation results, the right panel (\OLS") shows
¯xed e®ects estimation results without instrumentation. Table 2 provides a list of instruments used in the IV estimation.
Both speci¯cations contain quarter dummies and year dummies. The asteriks \***" indicates statistical signi¯cance at the
one percent marginal signi¯cance level.
27Table 6: Implied estimation results
Price Advertising
Cover Marginal cost \Usual" \Markup revenue
price cost di®erence markup deterioration" per copy
Fashion magazines
Elle 4.0 6.4 -2.4 1.0 5.0 36
Madame 6.0 7.5 -1.5 0.7 4.1 29
Marie Claire 2.5 2.7 -0.2 0.7 1.6 12
Vogue 6.0 12.5 -6.5 0.8 10.4 74
Lifestyle magazines
Allegra 1.0 1.1 -0.1 0.7 1.0 8
Amica 2.6 4.9 -2.4 0.6 4.2 30
Carina 2.3 1.8 0.5 0.6 0.6 5
Cosmopolitan 2.6 3.9 -1.3 0.7 3.0 22
Frau im Leben 2.0 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.3 2
Maxi 1.8 1.9 -0.1 0.7 1.2 9
Petra 2.5 3.4 -0.9 0.7 2.4 17
Prima Carina 2.3 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 3
Ratgeber Frau und Familie 2.0 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 1
Classical magazines
Brigitte 2.2 3.0 -0.8 0.8 2.3 34
Freundin 2.2 3.3 -1.1 0.7 2.6 38
FÄ ur Sie 2.1 2.2 -0.1 0.7 1.3 19
Journal fÄ ur die Frau 2.1 1.7 0.3 0.6 0.8 11
Woman 1.1 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 13
Counselling magazines
Bella 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.3 9
Bild der Frau 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.3 9
Laura 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 6
Lea 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.1 2
Lisa 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.2 7
Tina 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.3 8
\Girls" magazines
Bravo Girl 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.7 0.5 7
Joy 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.7 1.1 8
MÄ adchen 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.4 5
Yam! 1.3 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.2 6
Brigitte Young Miss 1.5 1.4 0.1 0.6 0.9 7
\Yellow" magazines
7 Tage 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.1 3
Das Goldene Blatt 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.1 3
Das Neue 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.0 1
Das Neue Blatt 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.1 2
Die Aktuelle 1.5 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.1 3
Die neue Frau 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.1 2
Echo der Frau 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.1 2
Frau aktuell 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.1 3
Frau im Spiegel 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.2 6
Frau mit Herz 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.1 4
Heim und Welt 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.2 5
Neue Post 1.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.1 2
Neue Revue 1.6 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.1 4
Neue Welt 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.1 3
Neue Woche 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.0 1
Vida 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.1 2
Welt der Frau 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.1 2
Woche der Frau 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.1 2
Table 6 displays estimation results that were backed out from the model. All ¯gures are absolute numbers and measured
in Euros.
28References
Anderson, S.P., A. de Palma and J.{F. Thisse (1992), Discrete Choice Theory of Product
Di®erentiation, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Argentesi, E. and L. Filistrucchi (forthcoming), `Estimating market power in a two-sided
market: the case of newspapers', European University Institute Working Paper ECO
2005/7; forthcoming in Journal of Applied Econometrics.
Armstrong, M. (2005), `Competition in Two-sided Markets'; forthcoming in Rand Jour-
nal of Economics.
Berry, S.T. and J. Waldfogel (1999), `Free Entry and Social Ine±ciency in Radio Broad-
casting', RAND Journal of Economics 30(3), 397{420.
Blair, R.D. and R.E. Romano (1993), `Pricing Decisions of the Newspaper Monopolist',
Southern Economic Journal 59(4), 721{732.
Bucklin, R.E., R.E. Caves and A.W. Lo (1989), `Games of Survival in the US Newspaper
Industry', Applied Economics 21, 631{649.
Chaudri, V. (1998), `Pricing and E±ciency of a Circulation Industry: The Case of
Newspapers', Information Economics and Policy 10, 59{76.
Corden, W.M., (1952{1953), `The maximisation of pro¯t by a newspaper ¯rm', The
Review of Economic Studies 20(3), 181{190.
Dertouzos, J.N. and K.E. Thorpe (1982), Newspaper groups: economies of scale, tax
laws, and merger incentives, RAND Corporation Research, Santa Monica.
Dertouzos, J.N. and W.B. Trautmann (1990), `Economic E®ects of Media Concentra-
tion: Estimates from a Model of the Newspaper Firm', The Journal of Industrial
Economics 39(1), 1{14.
Dewenter, R. and U. Kaiser (2006), `Anmerkungen zur Ä okonomischen Bewertung von
Fusionen auf dem Printmedienmarkt', Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 7(3), 335-
354
Dewenter, R. and K. Kraft (2002), Pricing in Interrelated Markets, University of Dort-
mund mimeo.
Doganoglu, T. and J. Wright (2006), `Multihoming and Compatibility', International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(1), 45-67.
Dukes, A. and E. Gal{Or (2003), `Negotiation and exclusivity contracts for advertising',
Marketing Science 22(2), 222{245.
Ferguson, J.M. (1983), `Daily Newspaper Advertising Rates, Local Media Cross{ownership,
Newspaper Chains and Media Competition', Journal of Law & Economics 26(3),
635{654.
Filter, 2001, `Businessplan 2001{2006';
http://www.¯lternetz.de/ dokumente/businessplan FILTER.pdf
Ganglo®, T.P., 2001, `Filmzeitschriften jenseits von `Cinema': Unter dem Radar';
http://www.igmedien.de/publikationen/m/2001/1 2/21.html.
29Genesove, D. (2003), Why Are There So Few (And Fewer and Fewer) Two{Newspaper
Towns?, Hebrew University of Jerusalem mimeo.
Hausman, J. (1997), `Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Imperfect Competi-
tion,' Bresnahan, T. and R. Gordon (Eds.), The Economics of New Goods, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Jahreszeitenverlag (1994{2004), Funktions{Analyse: Factbook fÄ ur Inhalte und Portaits
von Zeitschriften, Jahreszeitenverlag, Hamburg.
Kaiser, U. and J. Wright (2006), `Price Structure in Two{Sided Markets: Evidence from
the Magazine Industry', International Journal of Industrial Organization 24(1), 1{
28.
Ludwig, J. (2003), MikroÄ okonomie der Medien, in Altmeppen, K.{D. and M. Karmasin
(Eds.): `Medien und Ä Okonomie', Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen.
Merrilees, W.J. (1983), `Anatomy of a Price Leadership Challenge: An Evaluation of
Pricing Strategies in the Australian Newspaper Industry', The Journal of Industrial
Economics 31(3), 291{311.
Nevo, A. (2001), `Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry', Econo-
metrica, 69(2), 307{342.
Rochet, J-C. and J. Tirole (forthcoming), `Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report,'
forthcoming in Rand Journal of Economics.
RÄ oller, L.H., D. J. Stenback and F. Verboven (2000), E±ciency Gains from Mergers
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fÄ ur Sozialforschung Discussion Paper FS IV 00{09.
Rosse, J.N. (1967), `Daily Newspapers, Monopolistic Competition, and Economies of
Scale', The American Economic Review 57(2), 522{533.
Rosse, J.N. (1970), `Estimating Cost Function Parameters Without Using Cost Data:
Illustrated Methodology', Econometrica 38(2), 256{275.
Rysman, M. (2004), `Competition between networks: a study of the market for yellow
pages', Review of Economic Studies, 71 (2), 483{512.
Rysman, M., (forthcoming), `An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage,' forthcom-
ing in: Journal of Industrial Economics.
Thompson, R.S. (1989), `Circulation Versus Advertiser Appeal in the Newspaper In-
dustry: An Empirical Investigation', The Journal of Industrial Economics 37(3),
259{271.
Wagner, K. (1981), `The newspaper industry in Britain, Germany and the United States',
National Institute Economic Review 95, 81{88.
30Appendix A: descriptive statistics








Share consumers 14{19 years 0.10 0.16
Share consumers 20{29 years 0.14 0.09
Share consumers 30{39 years 0.17 0.06
Share consumers 40{49 years 0.15 0.04
Share consumers 50{59 years 0.15 0.05
Content shares
Children 0.01 0.01
Fashion for purchase 0.13 0.11
Self{crafted fashion 0.01 0.01
Cosmetics 0.05 0.04
Cooking 0.08 0.05









The arts 0.03 0.03
Sensational journalism 0.01 0.01
VIPs 0.20 0.14
Fiction 0.13 0.09
Sex as entertainment 0.00 0.01
TV program 0.01 0.02













Average ln(adpages) of other magazines by publisher 7.52 1.18
Average cover price of other magazines by publisher 1.54 0.64
Dummy for supplement in at least one other magazine by publisher 0.90 0.29
Average circulation of other magazines by publisher 15.36 1.36
Pulp & paper index 565.58 143.34
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 1 16.43 98.07
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 2 147.63 258.71
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 3 56.30 177.32
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 4 3.89 43.78
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 5 16.43 98.07
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 6 61.41 182.52
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 7 32.86 136.73
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 8 65.44 186.24
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 9 27.22 126.14
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 10 61.44 182.59
Pulp & paper index interacted with dummy for publisher 11 49.30 165.01





Cover price (®) 1.90 1.13
ln(sjjg) (¾) -2.18 0.82
Advertising share 0.26 0.13
ln(# content pages) 4.47 0.37
Content shares
Handicraft 0.02 0.02
Self{crafted fashion 0.01 0.05
Cosmetics 0.05 0.04 Cooking 0.08 0.06










The arts 0.03 0.03
Sensational journalism 0.01 0.01
VIPs 0.20 0.14
Fiction 0.11 0.08
Sex as entertainment 0.00 0.01
TV program 0.01 0.02
Service pages of the editors 0.05 0.02













1st quarter 0.25 |
2nd quarter 0.25 |
3rd quarter 0.25 |
Instruments
Average cover price of other magazines 1.42 0.73
by publisher at t
Average cover price of other magazines 1.42 0.73
by publisher at t ¡ 1
Pulp & paper index 564.65 164.37
# of segments own publisher active in/ 0.36 0.30
# of segments competing publishers active in
# of segments own publisher active in at t 0.37 0.33
# of segments competing publishers active in at t
Dummy for supplement in at least one 0.81 0.39
other magazine by publisher 3.33 2.57
# adpages in other magazines by own publisher at t
# content pages in other magazines by own publisher 5.60 1.63




ln(marginal cost) 0.30 1.10
ln(printing volume by own publisher) 20.98 1.30
ln(circulation) 12.80 0.69
ln(# of pages) 6.71 0.38
Pulp and paper index 6.30 0.25
Scope variables
# of titles by own publisher 15.86 11.84













1st quarter 0.25 0.43
2nd quarter 0.25 0.43
3rd quarter 0.25 0.43
Instruments
Average cover price of other magazinest¡4 1.42 0.74




33Appendix B: ¯rst stage regressions
Inverse demand for advertising equation
ln(# of advertising pages) ln(circulation)
Coe®. Std. Err. Coe®. Std. Err.
Consumer age shares
Share consumers 14{19 years 1.36** 0.57 -1.52*** 0.36
Share consumers 20{29 years -0.35 0.59 0.08 0.38
Share consumers 30{39 years 1.34*** 0.51 0.59* 0.32
Share consumers 40{49 years 1.67*** 0.64 0.67* 0.41
Share consumers 50{59 years 0.75 0.57 -0.28 0.36
Content shares
Children 5.33* 2.77 2.49 1.78
Fashion for purchase -4.36*** 1.33 1.38 0.85
Self{crafted fashion -3.83** 1.85 1.68 1.18
Cosmetics -4.40*** 1.53 1.86* 0.98
Cooking -3.95** 1.68 0.40 1.08
Interior design -2.60* 1.46 0.27 0.93
Politics -4.69* 2.75 3.60** 1.76
Health -3.48** 1.47 -0.05 0.94
Partnership -3.74*** 1.44 1.02 0.92
Vacation -6.25*** 1.58 -0.31 1.01
Counselling -4.25** 1.80 -0.89 1.15
Hobby -6.60** 2.62 -2.62 1.68
Cars 1.32 3.82 4.98** 2.45
Science -4.24*** 1.62 0.43 1.04
The arts -4.15** 1.79 1.52 1.15
Sensational journalism -7.47*** 2.12 3.92*** 1.36
VIPs -4.66*** 1.31 0.46 0.84
Fiction -5.34*** 1.26 1.86** 0.81
Sex as entertainment -2.64 3.08 -1.66 1.97
TV program -2.85* 1.67 0.59 1.07
Service pages of the editors -3.13** 1.57 0.47 1.01
Constant 33.93*** 9.19 3.23 5.74
Instruments
Average ln(adpages) of other magazines 0.29*** 0.07 -0.05 0.05
by publisher *
Average cover price of other magazines -0.02** 0.11 0.12 0.07
by publisher ***
Dummy for supplement in at least one -0.22*** 0.09 0.02 0.06
other magazine by publisher
Pulp & paper index -0.20 0.08 0.07 0.05
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 1 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 2 ¤ 1,000 -0.14 0.69 -0.56 0.44
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 3 ¤ 1,000 -0.57 0.51 -0.52 0.33
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 4 ¤ 1,000 -0.59 0.54 -0.51 0.35
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 5 ¤ 1,000 0.67 2.30 -1.04 1.47
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 6 ¤ 1,000 -0.58** 0.65 -0.51* 0.42
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 7 ¤ 1,000 -0.45 0.54 -0.29*** 0.35
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 8 ¤ 1,000 -0.25 0.57 -0.48 0.37
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 9 ¤ 1,000 -1.07 0.55 -0.60* 0.35
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 10 ¤ 1,000 -0.51 0.58 -1.21** 0.37
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 11 ¤ 1,000 -0.31 0.53 -0.43 0.34
Pulp & paper index ¢ publisher 12 ¤ 1,000 -0.68 0.56 -0.66 0.36
Tests for joint signi¯cance
F p{value F{test p{val.
All instruments 2.15 0.01 2.04 0.01
Pulp & paper index 1.44 0.14 1.66 0.07
Other instruments 3.67 0.01 1.69 0.15
Speci¯cation 14.88 0.00 13.20 0.00
Age shares 3.23 0.01 8.09 0.00
Content shares 2.99 0.00 4.51 0.00
Year dummies 3.85 0.00 10.14 0.00
\Within" R2, # of obs. and # of magazines
Within R2 0.39 0.71
# obs. 378 378
# magazines 42 42
The asteriks \***", \**" and \*" indicate statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve and ten percent marginal signi¯cance level.
34Magazine demand equation
ln(cover price) ln(sjjg) Share advertising pages # of content pages
Coe®. Std. Err. Coe®. Std. Err. Coe®. Std. Err. Coe®. Std. Err.
Fashion for purchase 1.68*** 0.58 1.28*** 0.48 0.32*** 0.12 1.16*** 0.31
Self{crafted fashion -0.24 0.47 1.36*** 0.38 0.23** 0.10 0.56** 0.25
Cosmetics -1.67*** 0.49 1.53*** 0.40 0.21** 0.10 0.21 0.26
Cooking 2.41*** 0.41 -0.64* 0.34 0.13 0.09 -0.05 0.22
Interior design 0.16 0.51 0.35 0.41 0.39*** 0.11 0.07 0.27
Politics -0.13 0.97 0.35 0.79 -0.21 0.21 -0.18 0.52
Children 1.14 0.97 3.21*** 0.79 0.90*** 0.21 0.51 0.52
Health 2.58*** 0.38 -0.59* 0.31 0.14* 0.08 0.44** 0.20
Partnership 1.42*** 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.10 0.09 0.79*** 0.22
Vacation -0.31 0.45 0.31 0.37 0.01 0.10 0.33 0.24
Counselling 3.73*** 0.62 -0.92* 0.51 0.20 0.13 -0.54* 0.33
Hobby 4.38*** 0.91 -1.28* 0.75 0.17 0.19 1.32*** 0.49
Cars -4.53*** 1.42 2.24** 1.16 0.56* 0.30 0.76 0.76
Science 0.21 0.49 0.27 0.40 0.05 0.10 0.58** 0.26
The arts -1.11* 0.59 3.90*** 0.48 0.45*** 0.13 -0.33 0.32
Sensational journalism -1.51* 0.80 4.18*** 0.65 -0.25 0.17 -0.30 0.43
VIPs 1.05*** 0.24 -1.49*** 0.20 -0.04 0.05 0.31** 0.13
Fiction 0.62* 0.34 1.21*** 0.28 -0.06 0.07 0.01 0.18
Sex as entertainment 5.81*** 0.99 3.56*** 0.81 -0.08 0.21 1.33*** 0.53
TV program -0.63 0.56 0.52 0.46 0.21* 0.12 0.17 0.30
Service pages of the editors -0.13 0.46 0.71* 0.37 0.05 0.10 0.57** 0.24
Content concentration 0.76* 0.40 2.64*** 0.33 0.18** 0.08 0.17 0.21
Year dummies
1994 0.21*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01
1995 0.21*** 0.03 0.07*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01
1996 0.18*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.03*** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.01
1997 0.16*** 0.02 0.04** 0.02 0.03*** 0.00 -0.02* 0.01
1998 0.17*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01*** 0.00 -0.01 0.01
1999 0.17*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01** 0.00 -0.01 0.01
2000 0.13*** 0.03 0.05* 0.02 0.01** 0.01 0.00 0.02
2001 0.11*** 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01*** 0.01 0.00 0.01
2002 0.00 0.02 -0.03* 0.02 0.01** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.01
2003 0.00 0.02 -0.02* 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02* 0.01
Quarter dummies
1st quarter 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.01 0.01
2nd quarter -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02*** 0.01
3rd quarter 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.01
Constant 1.17*** 0.27 -2.75*** 0.22 0.19*** 0.06 4.19*** 0.14
Instruments
Average cover price of -0.08** 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04* 0.02
other magazines
by publisher at t
Average cover price 0.07* 0.04 0.11*** 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.07*** 0.02
of other magazines
by publisher at t ¡ 1
Pulp & paper index 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
# of segments own 0.14*** 0.05 0.11*** 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03
publisher active in/
# of segments competing
publishers active in at t
# of segments own -0.11** 0.05 0.10*** 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
publisher active in/
# of segments competing
publishers active in at t ¡ 1
Dummy for supplement in at least one 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01
other magazine by publisher
# adpages in other magazines 0.03*** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00** 0.00 -0.01** 0.01
by own publisher at t
# content pages in other magazines -0.06*** 0.02 -0.03* 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01
by own publisher
# content pages in other magazines 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
by own publisher at t ¡ 1
Tests for joint signi¯cance
F{test p{val. F{test p{val. F{test p{val. F{test p{val.
All instruments 5.70 0.00 8.19 0.00 2.79 0.00 8.13 0.00
Price instruments 1.61 0.18 11.45 0.00 3.32 0.02 12.89 0.00
Within group market share instr. 4.05 0.02 19.42 0.00 3.21 0.04 0.08 0.93
Adshare instruments 3.70 0.03 0.34 0.71 2.69 0.07 8.53 0.00
Content pages instruments 6.88 0.00 7.69 0.00 2.06 0.13 0.34 0.71
Tests for joint signi¯cance of speci¯cation and ¯xed e®ects and \within" R2
Speci¯cation 18.09 0.00 28.79 0.00 20.07 0.00 449.25 0.00
Fixed e®ects 13.93 0.00 50.36 0.00 69.54 0.00 117.23 0.00
Within R2 0.3346 0.445 0.3581 0.1125
The asteriks \***", \**" and \*" indicate statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve and ten percent marginal signi¯cance level.
35Marginal cost equation
ln(printing volume) ln(circulation) ln(pages)
Coe®. Std. Err. Coe®. Std. Err. Coe®. Std. Err.
# of titles by own publisher 0.02*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 0.003* 0.002
# groups own publisher is active in 0.06*** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.003 0.004
Year dummies
1994 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.015 0.012
1995 -0.06*** 0.02 -0.03** 0.01 -0.043*** 0.010
1996 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.016 0.010
1997 -0.11*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.01 -0.026*** 0.010
1998 -0.08*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.026** 0.011
1999 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 -0.015 0.016
2000 -0.12*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 -0.014 0.013
2001 -0.15*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.060*** 0.012
2002 -0.16*** 0.02 -0.09*** 0.01 -0.036*** 0.012
2003 -0.20*** 0.02 -0.13*** 0.02 -0.035*** 0.012
Quarter dummies
1st quarter 0.00 0.01 0.02*** 0.01 -0.019*** 0.006
2nd quarter -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.010* 0.006
3rd quarter -0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.01 -0.024*** 0.006
Constant 7.65*** 0.47 2.53*** 0.38 2.475*** 0.310
Instruments
Average cover price of other magazines 0.06*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.01 0.020** 0.010
by publisher at t ¡ 4
ln(circulation) at t ¡ 4 0.13*** 0.02 0.78*** 0.02 -0.005 0.016
ln(printing volume) at t ¡ 4 0.55*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.017 0.016
ln(# pages) at t ¡ 4 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.599*** 0.021
Tests of joint signi¯cance
Test p{value Test p{value Test p{value
All instruments 246.90 0.00 547.04 0.00 224.37 0.00
Speci¯cation 127.18 0.00 263.04 0.00 59.84 0.00
Fixed e®ects 12.67 0.00 9.42 0.00 9.36 0.00
\Within" R2, # of magazines and # of obs.
\Within" R2 0.6152 0.7678 0.43
# of observations 1,659 1,659 1,659
# of magazines 48 48 48
The asteriks \***", \**" and \*" indicate statistical signi¯cance at the one, ¯ve and ten percent marginal signi¯cance level.
36Appendix C: external validation
Since cost information is probably the best kept secret in any industry, an external model
validation is hard to perform, and what I do below might even be considered as an exercise
in comparing apples and oranges. Indeed, the lack of cost data is the main reason why
economists wish to estimate marginal cost in the ¯rst place. After a thorough internet
search and several inquiries at publishing houses and ¯rms from the printing industry, I
received data on marginal cost for four German magazines.
Marginal cost for two of these four magazines were obtained from the internet. They
correspond to \Der Schnitt" and \Filter", both cinema magazines that are comparable
the women's magazines analyzed here in terms of circulation and the number of pages.
According to Ganglo® (2001), who cites the editor{in{chief of \Der Schnitt", the printing
cost per copy of this magazine is 0.94 Euro. A business plan of \Filter", a magazine
that is ¯nanced by a venture capitalist, shows that the editors estimate that paper and
printing costs per copy are 0.78 Euro (Filter 2001). The upper part of the table below
compares these marginal cost estimates gathered from industry sources with the estimated
marginal cost to those magazines that come closest to \Der Schnitt" and \Filter" in terms
of the number of pages and in terms of circulation. The table shows that the marginal
cost for the two cinema magazines correspond well to the estimated marginal cost for the
corresponding women's magazines.
The \actual" cost data in the lower part of the table stem from an advertiser and a
representative from the printing industry.
While estimated and \real" cost are comparable in the upper panel of the table below,
there are substantial di®erences between them in the lower panel. Marginal cost appear
to be clearly over{estimated for the fashion magazines \Elle", \Madame" and \Vogue".
For \Marie Claire" my cost estimates are in the reasonable range again, however.
While it is clearly questionable if the evidence presented in the table is really more
than just a comparison of apples and oranges, the comparison at least indicates that
my marginal cost estimates are not completely o® reality.
Circulation Pages Marginal cost Cover
per issue per issue per issue price
Der Schnitt 12,000 60 0.94 1.33
Filter 20,000 80 0.78 1.43
7 Tage 144,209 77 0.72 1.40
Heim und Welt 112,576 76 0.77 1.40
Vida 166,192 60 0.35 1.00
Magazine X [230,000;270,000] [300;350] 3.67 [2.04;2.55]
Allegra 219,380 235 2.48 1.95
Amica 275,263 302 3.95 2.00
Magazine Y [200,000;250,000] [250;300] 4.08 [3.06;3.57]
Elle 202,115 290 6.29 4.00
Madame 98,092 235 6.84 5.00
Marie Claire 156,153 215 2.67 2.50
Vogue 112,112 290 11.27 5.00
Cost data and prices are in Euros.
37